John Maynard Keynes made a prediction in 1930 that by 2030 we would be working 15 hours per week. And if AI lives up to its admittedly high expectations this may come true. Maybe not for all but at least for some of us.
According to an article on Bloomberg, a financial news and data provider, the Nobel Prize-winning economist Robert William Fogel demonstrated that the average number of lifetime hours that people worked for pay dropped from 182’100 in 1880 to 122’400 in 1995 — a 33% decline in an era of increasing lifespans. From 2000 to 2019, per capita hours worked in the US fell from 926 hours to 885. Fogel also demonstrated that whereas 74% of consumer budgets went to necessities (food, shelter and clothing) in 1875, 68% went to leisure activities by 1995.
The AI revolution is beginning to do for knowledge work what the combine harvester did for agriculture and the factory did for mechanical jobs — mechanising routine tasks that were once reserved for human beings before moving remorselessly up the value chain. Numerous knowledge-intensive companies are eliminating middle-management jobs and cutting back on hiring new graduates (which certainly also in part explains the high unemployment rates among 16 to 24 year olds).
Obviously if we were to work a mere 15 hours per week, the salaries paid by employers would have to match that – which brings then to the fore once again the idea of a universal income, paid by the government and funded through taxes on the increased productivity achieved through artificial intelligence.
As the article rightly states, jobs not only provide people with an income, but also a number of psychological benefits such as social connections, pride and self-worth. So what are we going to do with our extra spare time (and in particular those of us who already complain about never having enough time anyway)?
Some workers would adapt quickly, embracing the freedom to pursue hobbies, creative endeavours, and long‑abandoned personal ambitions. They would likely experience improved well‑being, with lower stress and more time for family and community.
But others might struggle with the sudden abundance of unstructured time. Humans are not automatically good at filling empty space with meaningful activity. Feelings of boredom, restlessness, or even worthlessness could emerge—particularly if someone’s sense of value is closely tied to productivity or career status. The risk of a “crisis of purpose” would be real.
In theory, fewer hours could reduce burnout. However, the psychological effects would depend heavily on how society frames this shift. If the narrative suggests that shorter working hours mean reduced relevance or diminished contribution, individuals may internalise a sense of inadequacy.
On the other hand, if the transition is presented as progress—a reward of technological advancement rather than a sign of redundancy—people may experience better mental health overall. The key lies in cultural expectations: a society that normalises leisure and values non‑work pursuits will fare far better than one clinging to outdated notions of worth equating to labour.
With more time available, communities could flourish. People might volunteer more, pursue local projects, and generally invest in their social environments. Activities that once felt like luxuries—extended gatherings, communal gardening, skills‑sharing—could become integral parts of daily life.
Yet this optimistic view assumes that individuals naturally move towards social connection. In reality, some may retreat further into isolated digital worlds. If AI also takes over the role of companionship, entertainment, and decision‑making, the incentive to interact with real people could weaken. Society might quietly fragment into pockets of hyper‑individualised existence, each person absorbed in their personalised digital ecosystem.
Another complicating factor is inequality. While many might benefit from drastically reduced working hours, not all jobs can or will be fully automated. People in care work, logistics, maintenance, or other hands‑on roles may still face demanding schedules unless policy ensures equitable adjustments. This could create a psychological divide between the “AI‑liberated” and the “AI‑indispensable.”
Moreover, if reduced hours come with reduced income (some people will no doubt earn less in universal income than they would as full-time employees), the psychological benefits could evaporate overnight. Financial insecurity is a far more powerful stressor than long hours.
Ultimately, a 15‑hour working week would force society to reconsider the very structure of life. Schools, cities, family patterns, and personal aspirations have long been arranged around the demands of full‑time work. Removing that central pillar would require a cultural redesign.
The psychological outcome would depend on how well people learn to create meaning without relying on the traditional scaffolding of work. For some, this will be liberation; for others, disorientation. As with any technological revolution, the impact will not be in the machines themselves, but in how humans adapt—or fail to do so —to the new world they create.
While Keyne‘s prediction may sound appealing, the consequences are much less clear cut and would no doubt lead to a major reevaluation of society. This is something we all need to prepare ourselves for, as no doubt AI is becoming more prevalent in the future. It’s more a question of ‘when’ than ‘if’.
The grumpy older man 